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- Andrew
Bernard
- Faculty of
Environmental Studies
- York
University
- Toronto,
Ontario
How does Insight yield
insight into the interdependent nature of human knowing,
with respect to 'Ecological Knowledge': my
reflections
Introduction and
Conversation.
I have come to this discussion as
an ethicist, mostly, not as a moralist or humanist, and
certainly not as someone with a more than passing knowledge
of fisheries. Why such a clarification? Simply, as I wish to
make it clear at the outset my concerns reside within the
scope of methodology and epistemology. I am interested in
how communities and larger representative bodies come to
understand 'something'; and how this understanding shapes,
and is shaped, by the specific orientation of that community
to the natural world. Importantly, one must begin the
investigation at the level of the individual. What I mean by
this, is that if any gains in (the understanding and
knowledge of) conservation or sustainability are to be made
(indeed, if this is in fact what is most desirable), then a
careful examination of how the individual experiences,
understands, relates, and orients to the natural world is in
order.
As a preface to understanding
'ecological knowledge,' I would like to put forth some of
the goals of knowledge. Humans are questioning
beings. When faced with a new experience, we will actively
seek an understanding by questioning. The answers to these
questions will lead to further questions, in an effort to
assess our understanding as being correct, or incorrect,
relevant or irrelevant. Questions move us through the
operations of experiencing, understanding, and
judging.
Aligning myself with Bernard
Lonergan (Canadian theologian, whose work has influenced my
research methodology immensely), I see the subject as
intelligent, he seeks truth and insight, he experiences.
Insights accumulate and enhance the grounds for the
development of further insight, and these new insights
pervade ones ability to communicate and relate this
knowledge and understanding.
Human knowing, therefore, is
dynamic; it is self-assembling, self-constituting. One
cannot simply load and correlate data like a computer, you
must change and modify the foundations from which you work.
Lonergan argues that these processes of knowledge flow into
one another, make each other, until the whole is reached;
and that this occurs consciously, intelligently, rationally
- experience stimulates inquiry, inquiry is intelligence in
action, moving through imagination, to insight. We then,
correlate our insights with our understanding and form a
coherent whole.
'Ecological Knowledge'
Contexutalised.
There seems to be some consensus
that a working definition of 'ecological knowledge' is
required. I have addressed some of the objectives and
operative principles of knowledge (systems), and know I will
grapple what I think 'ecological knowledge' may
encompass.
It seems to me that 'ecological
knowledge' is a sum of various epistemologies, not
simply an operative foundation of traditional knowledges.
Traditional knowledges, at least as they are conceptualised
and utilised here, are not particularly capable of, nor do I
believe have as their goal, knowing (understanding)
ecological principles, per se. This is, of course, not to
say that traditional knowledges have not gained some
peculiar and pertinent insights into the nature of things -
the nature of causes and effects of human behaviour and
modification of nature (natural resource), and indeed some
of the 'natural' forces of nature which operate beyond the
scope of human understanding.
Rather, I would argue that the
insights of traditional knowledges are particular to a
specific set of questions. Those questions arise from the
needs, desires, and experiences of those in a community
whose sustainability have been dependant on a particular
resource, and more importantly, dependant on particular
methods of utilisation and management (management used here
only as an operative terms denoting practical, relational
criteria of use and abuse of any given resource) of that
resource. Indeed, as discussed elsewhere, there is a
particular historicity to any epistemology, which
necessarily effects the capacity to integrate one system of
knowledge into another - or perhaps more poignantly,
over-ride one system with another (see R. Rogers Position
paper).
The complementary, though not
necessarily so, epistemologies are brought from the applied
sciences, conservation ecology, management and commerce
communities, among many other faculties and sectors. Each
epistemology is dictated, shaped by a series, or sets, of
values and morals. Many of which arise from an individuals'
relationship and orientation to the natural
world.
Does scientific knowledge yield new
insights into ecosystem operations? Yes. Does traditional
knowledge necessarily yield a more intimate understanding of
specific aspects ecosystem operations? Yes, too. Can new
(collaborative) management models for sustainability (of
resource harvesting) help gain a more complete picture of
the affects and influences of market economies, large-scale
production, etc., on unpredictable and perhaps unknowable
ecosystems? Probably yes, too. Should policy inform natural
resource extraction, its subsequent sale, and its viability
as a continued resource? Perhaps if it is informed by a new
knowledge base. A new knowledge base which regards the
whole, rather than the essential components. One that
recognises the interdependence of social relations and
ecosystem integrity, as it is quite obvious one cannot do
without the other (unless of course, we humans weren't
around - or technology was able to supplement nature). The
fate of particular ecosystems is indeed in our hands - as
much as I hate to admit; and we too are preciously balanced
in the web life that is our living planet.
Defining 'Ecological
Knowledge'.
Perhaps what makes dialogue and
debate surrounding the issue of 'ecological knowledge' so
problematic, is the lack of consensus concerning an explicit
definition. Without a solid operational definition, the
dialogue is open to deconstruction and critique from almost
any angle. What predicates a definition, is the desire to
understand that which is seeking definition - the problem.
'Ecological knowledge' has, as it
operational objective, the construction of a working
base; a foundation from which an attempt to gain a
comprehensive understanding of ecological systems can be
formulated. From this base, or foundation, an effort to
reconstruct (conceptually, theoretically, or other) aspects,
components, or wholes, of ecosystems, appears to be desired.
The theoretical reconstruction has as its goal, a malleable,
working model of a specific ecosystem. There, I've come out
with it - now, what do I mean...
If 'ecological knowledge' is a sum
of various epistemologies, which come to represent the most
comprehensive, coherent, conceptualisation of a particular
ecosystem, natural resource, social and economic outlook,
and management objectives, in order to 'sustainably' exploit
the resource and the harvester, within a context of
'development', then a model must be formulated to test
hypotheses.
Problems in our System of
Inquiry.
It has been argued that
'conservation', 'sustainable development', and like concepts
have come into being through the inadequacies of, or indeed
as responses to, our market economy, world-view. I do not
dispute this. It also has been argued (see Louis Sass) that
our own interests in this sort of investigation, our own
inquiry, has been tainted by our inability to be involved
with that which we investigate. To the extent that we have
undergone a paradigmatic transformation, one which comes
over "our understanding of the world when we cease to be
involved and instead become passive, disengaged,
self-conscious, 'objective'".
To further this argument, this
expression of disengagement, Iain McGilcrest, notes that
there is a lack of a cohesive narrative line, neglect of
conventional space-time structure, loss of comprehensible
causal relations, and a disruption of the symbol-referent
relationship. Although he is speaking of characteristics of
schizophrenia, I feel that by attempting to implement a
'new' knowledge system (as has been, unsuccessfully, done in
the Atlantic fisheries communities), we too have passed the
gauntlet - missed the mark, so to speak.
Under examination, we can clearly
see that the narrative line of (pre-)existing fisheries
systems have been superseded, by a completely incoherent (at
least to those directly engaged in fishing) one. The 'new
(economic) way', over-rides the existing, seemingly stable
economic system, by imposing more 'efficient' operational
means to reach a new, better end. An end, which is beyond
the scope of the present, functioning
epistemologies.
Space-time structures of the global
economy, and indeed the New World ideology, necessarily
cannot account for local perspectives. It is the imposition
of a categorically incompatible spatio-temporal paradigm,
which not only wholly shifts current natural relationships
and understandings, but must also underwrite the culture of
experiential knowledge. The maxim, "Think globally, act
locally!", is an oxymoron in this context. It is wholly
presumptuous to expect someone, operating at a
self-sustaining capacity, to alter the social and ecological
dynamics of that particular region to conform to those of a
theoretical system which has no facility for the individual.
In the same way that Marxism must fail in
operation.
Finally, the loss of comprehensible
causal relations and the disruption of the symbol-referent
relationships, go hand in hand. From our retrospective, and
reflective seats we can see the now self-evident
incompatibility in underlying principles of supply and
demand. For example (one aside from the fisheries debate),
if an Ethiopian farming community has sustainably operated
within its capabilities for several generations, and with
the knowledge that a minimum yield must be met in order to
sustain the community, how will the introduction of tractors
benefit this society? Well, it won't. It is beyond the
epistemological capacities of this system to accommodate a
radical shift in technology. There is no skill to maintain
the equipment, no provisions for fuel, and further, no
resources to purchase the additional land which is needed
(needed, implied, whatever, by the aid agency, in order a
surplus can be generated). Perhaps additional ox, more
efficient irrigation techniques and planning knowledge could
be more usefully integrated into the existing epistemology.
Does the illustration of these
problems help us to define 'ecological knowledge'? I'm not
certain. It may, however, help us to contextualise the scope
of research concerning eco-knowledge. If it can be agreed,
that there must be another way of understanding ecosystems
(to have an ecosystemic understanding of the ways which
things operate), in order that a scheme for sustainable
development, or for natural resource conservation, or for
collaborative management models, may be devised, then
indeed, a comprehensive knowledge base must be formulated.
And this knowledge base must be informed by, and drawn from
a variety of perspectives. A specific methodological
framework must be crafted in order we make an meaningful
attempt at definition.
Concluding
Reflections.
Yet to be addressed are, what seems
to me anyway, the central questions surrounding ecological
knowledge. What, exactly, is ecological knowledge trying to
define? It is clear that knowledge is dynamic and
relational; and that by attempting to formulate some model
or understanding (as has been done - e.g., maximum
sustainable yield, etc.), onto a way of knowing, will
necessarily fail. As knowledge, let alone 'ecological
knowledge', is conceptually awkward, the challenge to
identify, determine the relational significance, the
cross-applicability, or transferability of a given
knowledge, is astounding. To do so in an environment where
not only are the operating knowledge systems are often
conflicting, and thus cloaked, but dealing with variables we
know so very little about, the degree of the challenge is
exponentially increased.
Can we infer that there may be
identifiable characteristics within each epistemology, which
may be integrated into something called 'ecological
knowledge'? I hope so, for if it weren't so, none of us
would be here. Perhaps by identifying the vulnerabilities in
each systems is a means to examining their respective
capacities to contribute to this new system. It is these
vulnerabilities which I propose hold the key to unlocking
the door to relational linkages. These vulnerabilities may
very well yield the individual values, the inarticulate
moral of right and wrong. A vulnerable system is a system in
which the capacity for reconciliation and adaptation operate
as self-reconstructive tendencies.
Earlier we spoke of insight,
Lonergan asks the reader to grasp that insight comes as a
release to the tension of inquiry, comes suddenly and
unexpectedly, is a function not of outer circumstances, but
of inner conditions, pivots between the concrete and the
abstract, and passes into the habitual texture of one's
mind. The natural desire to know, then, finds fulfilment in
insight. He says that when you catch on to something, get
the point, 'you catch on not unconsciously but consciously;
you 'know' something has happened, you 'know' that you are
knowing'.
How do we appropriate this
understanding of insight? It must simply be borne in mind
that by collectively working on this assignment, sharing
ideas, and debating points of contention, insight may be
had. Further, that the insights of each distinct
epistemology and perspective have occurred, and will
continue to occur at irregular rates. Any integration of new
methodological perspectives will require a period of
reflection, concern and understanding. Insight cannot be
forced - let us not obscure that which it is we seek. May we
also have the foresight to not stop at the initial insight,
but press further, questioning and understanding the
implications of each, so that insight may be had into
insight.
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