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- Christina
Hamm
- Clark
University
- Graduate School of
Geography
- 950 Main
Street
- Worcester, MA
01610
Conflict Resolution Frameworks: Guideposts
for Dialogue in Fisheries Co-management
Introduction
With many fisheries in crisis, fears and uncertainty
high, and community security at risk, the privileged
position and limits of fisheries management as practiced by
state-level regulatory agencies have come into question.
Ecological, community, and regulatory complexity have gained
recognition as important, yet vexing elements of fisheries
management (Finlayson, 1994; Hanna, 1997; Healey and
Hennessey, 1998; Wilson, 1982; Wilson et al., 1996).
Consequently, there is a shift toward adopting new models of
ecological and community complexity, identifying
stakeholders (or "shareholders"), and power sharing among
involved parties (Hanna, 1997; McCay and Jentoft, 1996; Sen
and Nielson, 1996) in an effort to develop institutional
capital for sustainable fisheries governance* (Hanna 1997).
Fisheries co-management is an alternative on this "new
frontier" of governance (Hanna, 1997; Pinkerton, 1989).
Essentially, co-management involves the claim to and
recognition of community stakes in resource management, and
the devolution of some decision-making and stewardship
responsibilities to the local level through government and
local resource-user/community partnerships (Berkes, 1997;
Fisher, 1996; Jentoft, 1997; McCay and Acheson, 1987).
Sustainability, efficiency, and equity are objectives
realized through participatory (and democratic)
multistakeholder decision making in co-management (Berkes,
1997; Jentoft, 1997; Sen and Nielson, 1996). Conditions for
co-management include trust, appropriate local and
governmental institutions, and protection of local rights
(Berkes, 1997).
In practice, a "spectrum" of co-management arrangements
reflects varying levels of input between local group and
government agency stakeholders (Sen and Nielson, 1996).
Moreover, stakeholders can comprise a number of groups that
may or may not be homogenous, and management decisions and
activities involving policy formulation (e.g., access
and harvesting rights, and associated enforcement) may be
especially contentious. Both the identification of
stakeholders and the politics of participation (The Corner
House, 1998), where knowledge, experience, and envisioned
futures are exchanged and even contested, are critical
elements in creating and realizing credible, integrated
resource regimes that can meet current and future challenges
of sustainability.
Complex policy issues must be addressed in the commons -
in coastal fisheries and elsewhere. Despite a recognized
need for participatory approaches in resource management,
some existing methods draw fire owing to their generation
within existing power structures (Corner House, 1998; McCay
and Jentoft, 1996; Rocheleau, 1994) and employment to
"engineer consent" in resource planning (Corner House,
1998). A noticeable shift favors more communicative and
discursive strategies (Fortmann, 1995; McCay and Jentoft,
1996; Roe, 1994; 1998) that engender increased understanding
for improved policy formation under conditions that are
uncertain, contentious, or complex. Social learning through
adaptive management and bounded conflict (Lee, 1993), and
communication through democratic processes that encourage
and incorporate critical feedback (i.e., "discursive
design") (Dryzek, 1990 as referenced in McCay and Jentoft,
1996) including "listening" (Fortmann, 1995), creates the
potential for developing collaborative and ultimately more
effective resource policies. In addition, there are multiple
approaches to conflict resolution that focus on
understanding and transformation. These appear to be
complementary, even nested, approaches for achieving
participatory co-management of fisheries.
* governance, resource regimes,
management systems, and institutions are used
interchangeably here
Among strategies introduced in this paper are models of
conflict analysis and resolution (Rubin, 1994) and narrative
policy analysis (Fortmann, 1995; Roe, 1994; 1998) within a
framework of social learning (Lee, 1993). Both narratives
and conflict resolution strategies are relevant for
developing understanding. These methods are dynamic,
flexible, and integrative, and provide clear guideposts for
engaging differing perspectives through forms of
dialogue.
Context and Current Issues
Social relations, in addition to resource characteristics
and dynamics, are critical elements of resource use that
influence the potential to achieve environmental
sustainability and community security. Regimes that govern
access to and use of resources are dynamic and complex, and
may develop within particular cultural contexts, yet may
also be subject to government regulations. Although various
structures comprise institutions, management regimes often
betray a narrow focus on regulatory structures (Jentoft,
1997). Much of the research focused on common-pool resources
and associated regimes highlight the complexity of resource
use, relationships among appropriators, as well as
relationships among appropriators, scientists, and managers,
and their rights and responsibilities under various,
sometimes overlapping, governing institutions (Acheson,
1987; 1988; Blomquist et al., 1995; Davis and Bailey,
1996; McCay and Acheson, 1987; Swallow, 1995; Wilson et
al, 1994). Traditional community-based regimes of local
access and regulation may be nested within, or exist outside
of, governmental resource-management institutions. For
example, the lobster fishing territories off the Maine (USA)
coast are de jure state property (inshore resources
are within the state of Maine's jurisdiction), but de
facto communal property, regulated by local communities
for access and exclusion (Acheson, 1988; Feeny et
al., 1990; Schlager and Ostrom, 1992).
With such complexity and overlap, existing
community-based management systems have the potential to
inform, reconcile, or conflict with government
fisheries-management programs. The lobstermen of Monhegan
Island, Maine, have codified their local, island-based
regime by establishing a Lobster Conservation Zone through
state legislation that recognizes a century of
self-regulation and local stewardship, even though mainland
lobstermen have also fished the island waters (Griffin,
1998; Ramer, 1997). Further down the east coast of the
United States, in the Long Island Sound between New York and
Connecticut, the Fishers Island Lobster Conservation Zone is
being challenged in court (Haberstroh, 1998), expropriated
in practice, and renegotiated for the future. Although
legislative initiatives may codify and legitimize particular
rights, they do not reconcile interests of all stakeholders,
and third party intervention (often carried out through
legal systems), enlisted in some cases to enhance the
potential for agreement, "can be an instrument of
destruction if applied unwisely" (Rubin, 1994, p. 33), as it
may serve only to root adversarial positions more firmly.
Settlement does not signify understanding or resolution.
Learning
Kai Lee (1993) promotes the notion of social learning
through "adaptive management " and "bounded conflict," an
iterative and participatory process driven by the goal of
environmental and economic sustainability. Adaptive
management involves framing "experiments" within natural
resource policy, where both success and failure provide
lessons for more informed policy. Rather than being a form
of trial and error in the face of uncertain
human-environment relationships, adaptive management
recognizes the opportunity to incorporate "clearly
formulated hypotheses about the behavior of an ecosystem
being changed by human use" (Lee, 1993, p. 53) into policies
that test expectations. The lessons learned serve as inputs
in the development of ever more effective policies. "For
example, commercial fishery regulation, monitored by a
regulating authority, can readily be designed in an
experimental fashion. If the policy succeeds, the hypothesis
is affirmed. But if the policy fails, an adaptive design
still permits learning, so that future decisions can proceed
from a better base of understanding." (Lee, 1993, p.
53).
Lee acknowledges that information gathering and political
risks attendant on failures are tangible costs associated
with adaptive management, but uncertainty and complexity
continue to challenge environmental policies at all scales.
He describes bounded conflict as competition within a
political framework through formal and informal rules.
"Chief among them is a shared commitment to address
important issues through continual debate." (Lee, 1993, p.
9). In short, bounded conflict guides dialogue.
How can adaptive management and bounded conflict engage
local knowledge and bioeconomic fisheries science? Both
forms of knowledge contribute to co-management, where
learned experience through past "experiments" as well trial
and error from different perspectives may be coupled to
provide a starting point for adaptive management and the
development of new policies within an evolving framework.
Furthermore, co-management builds new institutional arenas
providing the opportunity for creative problem-solving.
Frameworks of conflict resolution invite consideration as
possible approaches for conducting bounded conflict in this
new arena.
Collaborative Efforts and Conflict Resolution
Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA) (Chambers, 1983;
1989) and Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) (Paniagua and
Sabbadini, 1996) are popular collaborative planning tools
that begin at the local level. These field methods encompass
information collection, consensus-building, and community
visioning. For example, community resource mapping (Moore,
1996) provides an accessible, interactive forum for dialogue
that involves mapping for sharing knowledge, ideas, and
visions. Conflict resolution frameworks have a role in
encouraging dialogue outside of a political framework with
the objective of collaborative decision making and
transformation. Conflict management in the form of
negotiation or bargaining has shifted from adversarial
positional bargaining and third-party intervention to
alternatives based on interests, human needs, and
transformation, and often involve a mediator or facilitator.
The methods that provide frameworks for bounded conflict
include Principled, Needs-based, Comprehensive systemic, and
Transformative approaches to conflict resolution.
Principled Negotiation and Conflict Resolution
Fisher and Ury (1991) present a form of conflict
resolution known as interest-based or principled
negotiation, based on interests behind positions. In
essence, participants are problem-solvers, and negotiation
should be wise and efficient and should enhance (or never
compromise) the relationship between parties (Fisher and
Ury, 1991). Principled negotiation focuses on revealing and
developing the means for achieving common interests defined
by needs, fears, concerns, and desires. Other elements of
principled negotiation entail separating the people from the
problem; generating several possible solutions for mutual
gain, and forging decisions based on objective criteria. In
fisheries, for example, reconciled interests (a starting
point) manifest as a mutual desire to maintain a viable
fishery for ecological, economic, and community health and
security. Fears may emerge over issues of autonomy or being
"taken over" by a larger authority, restrictions to resource
access and appropriation, or loss of identity. Separating
people from the problem is necessary to diffuse the often
polarized "us" and "them" views common to positions. To
create options for mutual gain, it is necessary to diagnose
obstacles, and to consider and use methods or prescriptions
facilitating mutual goals. Reconciliation of subjective
concerns and objective criteria are critical challenges
facing co-management.
Human-Needs-Based Conflict Resolution
Although difference is considered a necessary condition
for conflict, it is not a sufficient driving force of
conflict. Ultimately, it is threats to the human needs of
identity, security, belonging, and recognition (of that
identity) that are considered the root causes of conflict.
Therefore, conflict is based on both differences of
interests and threats to human needs. Human needs theory in
conflict negotiation developed as an alternative to legal or
coercive means to conflict settlement and has been focused
primarily on international conflict. Human needs theory,
however, has been further developed for broader applications
in conflict negotiation. Burton (1987) distinguishes needs
and interests and recognizes the value-laden nature of
conflicts; Kelman (1992) focuses on concerns and priorities,
as well as perceptual and cognitive constraints to
negotiation, and explores the utility of third-party
facilitators; and Mitchell (1990), explores the potential of
basic human needs (BHN) theory to provide both a theory of
conflict drivers and remedies, while questioning the
dichotomy between settlement and resolution based on partial
or full satisfaction of needs. In general, conflict
negotiation based on human needs theory recognizes the
existence of deep motivations, values, and concerns that
cannot be compromised or negotiated. Interests that underlie
positions, however, are potentially negotiable. The
methodological approach to needs-based conflict negotiation
promoted by Kelman requires the development of a needs
assessment, joint thinking to create an agreement responsive
to the needs of all parties, identification of constraints
to agreement, and responses to constraints for reaching
agreement, and the creation of an action plan to implement a
responsible agreement. As such, this approach is applicable
at multiple scales and offers a model that merits
consideration in the negotiation of management policies
within a co-managed resource regime.
Comprehensive Systemic Approach: Leadership
Model
The systemic approach to conflict analysis and resolution
developed by Heifetz (1994) focuses on values of leadership
through the balance of responsibility and pressure. The
systemic approach recognizes potential for change within a
given system by addressing dynamics of a particular
situation at all levels. The systemic approach identifies
adaptive challenges by assessing the gap between shared
values and reality of lives or, community conflict over
values or strategy. Issues are addressed in an holistic
manner, regardless of the myriad stakeholders and their
interests. The systemic approach advocates the use of
partners, because no particular authority is privileged, and
there are opportunities for allied, cooperative partnership
(the recognition of such opportunities is part of
co-management). Additionally, because individuals in
leadership positions often wear more than one hat, they can
be aware of multiple positions or perspectives. This
facilitates self-reflection, and understanding of bias.
Where role and self are not distinct however, biases may be
entrenched.
Conflict Transformation and Empowerment
The transformative approach to conflict analysis focuses
on relationships and mediation. This relatively new
perspective is based on the work of Bush and colleagues
(1994) on mediation, Galtung (1995) on resolution and
transformation, and Lederach (1995) on cross-cultural
transformation. Other models discussed here aim for
settlement or resolution, but the key goals of this method
are empowerment and recognition. Empowerment refers to a
sense of achievement with regard to goals, options, skills,
resources and decision making. Empowerment addresses
elements considered in human-needs theory including
self-worth (identity) and security. Recognition refers to
coming to terms with another party's perspective through the
underlying desire to achieve understanding of the other,
demonstrated in thought, words, and actions. This involves
focusing on the needs of both parties, also integral
components of human-needs theory. A voluntary transformative
shift, achieved through mediation, underlies the types of
relationships necessary for learning opportunities.
Transformation is seen as an opportunity to change thinking.
This method is intended to promote moral development and
thinking that requires the integration of the autonomous
individual and concern for others, resulting in mutually
experienced empowerment and recognition.
Narrative Policy Analysis
Finally, narrative policy analysis is the application of
contemporary literary theory to seemingly "intractable"
public policy issues (Roe, 1994; 1998) to engage and access
complexity. In effect, narrative policy analysis facilitates
the exploration and understanding of difficult policy issues
that generate multiple perspectives (Fortmann, 1995; Roe,
1994) by examining embedded policy narratives (i.e., the
conflicting stories developed in association with complex
and polarized issues). This form of analysis is undertaken
in an effort to reveal the role that narratives or
culturally embedded stories have in public policy, and to
facilitate the reformation of highly uncertain and complex
"policy problems in ways that make them more amenable to the
conventional policy analytical approaches of
micro-economics, statistics, organizational theory, law, and
public management practice." (Roe, 1994, p. 1). Like
conflict resolution frameworks, narrative policy analysis
aims to develop new understanding through a series of formal
steps: (1) identification of policy narratives in the form
of stories or scenarios, each with a beginning, middle, and
end, or in the form of arguments - the dominant narratives;
(2) identification of "nonstories" (without a beginning,
middle, and end) and "counter stories" that run counter to
dominant narratives; (3) comparison of dominant policy
narratives with existing "nonstories" and "counterstories"
to develop a metanarrative encompassing multiple
perspectives; and (4) recasting the public policy issue
through the metanarrative to reveal potential entry points
through which existing analytical tools may access a
difficult policy issue (Roe, 1994; 1998). Surely, narratives
such as the tragedy of the commons and its counter
narratives in fisheries governance exemplify the complexity
and difficulty of the current policy issues in this
realm.
Conclusion
Increasing resource and community vulnerability is a
manifestation of the developing crises in some fisheries,
and concerns associated with management, decisionmaking, and
representation, in an uncertain, and sometimes contentious,
policy-making arena continue to challenge fisheries
governance. Interests include maintaining autonomy,
representation, or both. Exploring alternative, integrated
forms of governance and policy generation through
co-management is dependent upon learning among stakeholders
and decision makers. More efficient learning can be
undertaken in the face of uncertainty by undertaking
adaptive management and dialogue. "Lessons learned" generate
heightened expectations and provide opportunities for
incorporating hypotheses into new policies for testing and
validation. Therefore, the lessons from fisheries science
and traditional knowledge systems can be incorporated into
new policy development. Furthermore, improved dialogue may
be achieved through bounded conflict (and carried out and
analyzed through several different frameworks) within
evolving co-management regimes. Concerns about identity and
recognition, in addition to the material resources, are
critical elements of transformation.
New approaches to dialogue through narrative policy
analysis, involving the development and analysis of
metanarratives, and conflict transformation and empowerment,
provide nuanced approaches for accessing complexity through
the exploration of multiple perspectives. Finally,
experience from existing fisheries governance regimes may
provide insights for nascent co-management institutions.
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