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- Svein
Jentoft
- Institute of
Planning and Community Studies
- University of
Tromso
- Tromso,
Norway
ECOLOGICAL FOLK
KNOWLEDGE: SOME METHODOLOGICAL
REMARKS
1. "A beloved child has many
names": This saying is akin to the kind of knowledge that
this seminar is focusing on: Traditional Ecological
Knowledge, Folk Knowledge, Local Knowledge, Practical
Knowledge, Indigenous Knowledge, Informal Knowledge, Tacit
Knowledge. There is an ongoing debate on which name is most
suitable (cf. for example Indigenous Knowledge and
Development Monitor, Vol. 7, Issue 1. March 1999). Theorists
find problems with each and everyone of these terms. For
instance, "traditional" suggests a pre-modern or anti-modern
notion of knowledge, while "local knowledge" suggest a type
knowledge either derived from, or just applicable, within a
specific locality. The notion of "practical knowledge" leads
to the connotation of experience as the only source of
resource users' knowledge, in contrast to theoretical
knowledge, i.e. developed through inductive or deductive
reasoning, and a kind of knowledge which is not informed by
science.
I think I prefer the concept
"ecological folk knowledge". It seems the less problematic
among all those that are being advanced today. This is
because it is broad and, hence, inclusive. Rather than being
caught up in an endless effort in trying to determine the
most appropriate and precise name, I argue that all these
terms refer to important aspects or dimensions of the
"thing" we are dealing with. In addition, I believe that the
reason why we have these debates on the most suitable term,
is that we tend to think in terms of dichotomies;
"traditional" in contrast to "modern", "practical" as the
opposite of "theoretical", "informal" (i.e. generated by
observation and participation) versus "formal" (i.e. based
on linguistic, Socratic teaching) and so forth. Obviously,
the knowledge we are trying to conceptualize is both
traditional and modern, theoretical and practical. Neither
is it entirely bounded by space, informal or tacit. It is
also applicable across spatial boundaries. It is partly
formal, i.e. derived from science. Likewise, it is to some
extent explicit, something that local users talk about and
can explain if necessary, for instance when approached by
social scientists. Conclusion: we must search along all the
mentioned avenues when we are trying to describe the
emprical content, source, expressions, and application of
ecological folk knowledge,. Following Maurice Bloch ("What
goes without saying: The conceptualization of Zafimaniry
society", in A. Kuper (ed.): Conceptualizing Society,
London, Routledge, 19?, p. 130), we should then not restrict
ourselves to the linguistic expression whether they are
formal or informal. Rather, we must also include "visual
imagery, other sensory cognition, the cognitive aspects of
learned practices, evaluations, memories of sensations, and
memories of typical examples." Moreoever, we are advised to
be "suspicious of over linguistic, over logic-sentential
conceptualizations."
2. There is inspiration in
Gregory and Mary Catherine Bateson's: Angels Fear: Towards
an Epistemology of the Sacred (Bantam Books, New York,
1988). Their definition of information as the "difference
that makes a difference" prompts a series of research
questions with respect to ecological folk knowledge. They
argue at a general level that we should be concerned with
the mental processes involved in building local
epistemologies. In other words, we should study the process
of knowing, how knowing is done, how we get to know what we
(think we) know. They point out that observation is the
observation not of the thing itself but the difference
between the thing and its surroundings. For instance, at the
most elementary level, it is not the matter of the ink but
the contrast between the ink and the paper that helps us
identify and again makes reading possible. Words get their
meaning precisely from that difference - which makes a
difference. They argue that all mental processes that lead
to knowing, in folk knowledge as well as in science, start
from the observation of differences. Knowledge is possible
because we/resource users respond to difference that
originates in the material world. Empirically, we as
researches should therefore seek to get a grip on those
differences that resource users identify when observing the
interface within and between natural and social systems.
Knowledge in relation to this material world (e.g. nature)
is like a map in relation to a terrain, according to the
Batesons. The map is not the terrain, but our own a
representation of it, which may be more or less detailed and
more and less accurate. The map may even be misleading. When
we say that ecological folk knowledge is informal, sometimes
tacit, it means that the map is "mental" , the chart is not
drawn on paper. The map is invisible to others except for
the fisher who keeps it in his head. But the Batesons would
argue that also the formal chart written "invisible ink" is
mental. (The map is not the terrain, but our creation -
notably not of the terrain but the map). "Biologists looking
at the natural world create their descriptions, for even
their most objective recorded data are artifacts of human
perception and selection" (p.151). In this respect there is
no difference between layperson and expert knowledge,
fisher's or marine scientist's. (This is also an
illustration of why definitions based conceptual dichotomies
lead us astray).
3. Another source of
inspiration is Fredrik Barth's "The Guru and the Conjurer:
Transactions in Knowledge and the Shaping of Culture in
Southeast Asia and Melanesia (Man, Vol. 25, No. 4: pp.
640-53, 1990). Two modes of managing knowledge in social
interaction, - to withhold it, i.e. veiling the knowledge
and sharing it with as few as possible, or the opposite,
laying it bare, revealing it to as many as possible. While
the transactions of the initiator-novice relation follows
the first principle, he claims that the Guru-follower
relationship in the Muslim and Hindu tradition embodies the
latter. The management and transmission of knowledge in the
fist instance take place as a gradual process of initiation,
where the novice has to go through certain stages, marked by
ceremonial rites, where the secret myths and knowledge are
revealed. In the latter instance, knowledge is transmitted
by being taught, and always in oral and linguistic form. The
Guru is an instructor, a teacher. He talks to his audience,
and his message is highly de-contextualized. As a result,
knowledge is easily transportable. In contrast, the
initiator is firmly bounded to his context, his knowledge is
untransportable except to immediately neighboring groups.
"[T]he form of knowledge he perpetuates, though it
may be strong on 'meaning', is weak on abstraction and
transportability and relatively limited in mass"(p.650). I
suggest that the transmittance of ecological folk knowledge
in fisheries is better captured by the Conjurer/initiator
model than the Guru model. Ecological folk knowledge is
usually only reluctantly revealed, and seldomly generally
publicized. The trust factor between the experienced fisher
and the young recruit is important, and there is usually a
close bond between the two, most often a kinship or
community relationship. Contextualization is an important
trait of ecological folk knowledge. Therefore it is not
easily transported. Fishers aquire knowledge of the
ecosystem based on their practical use of a particular
territory. Thus, one may assume that there is not a
ecological folk knowledge but many. Such knowledge may even
be highly influenced by the experience of using a particular
gear. Thus, one may find that the ecological knowledge of a
trawler fisher and a trap fisher may be quite different. The
conjurer/initiator model suggests why ecological fisher folk
knowledge is not easily accessible. Even if access is
permitted to the external researcher, there is ethical
problems involved in revealing this knowledge through
publication. A parallel: Medical folk knowledge of
indigenous peoples in tropical areas such as the Amazons,
have potentially great market value for western medicine. It
is highly problematic from an ethical point of view whether
indigenous peoples knowledge can be extracted by western
medicine without compensation, as is common practice (cf.
Tom Greaves ed.:Intellectual Property Rights for Indigenous
Peoples. A Source Book. Oklahoma City: Society for Applied
Anthropology, 1994).
4. Ecological folk knowledge
is rarely taught in schools. However, schools have an
important impact of the recognition, and hence, validation
of ecological folk knowledge. The reason is not always
obvious: as far as ecological folk knowledge is not
recognized as valid knowledge within the formal school
system, it is taken for granted that ecological folk
knowledge is something students do not need to know about
and be exposed to. The general attitude, often conveyed in
subtle forms, is often prejudiced and patronizing. Thus the
meta message is discouraging for the novice student. (For
and excellent parallel argument, se Paul Willis: Learning to
Labour. Gower Publishing Co. 1977)The more complex
explanation is that anything local is neglected as relevant
for modern careers. Formal education from primary level and
onwards has been "dis-embedded" from the local context. In
Norway, this has been regarded as a side-effect of a state
effort in making education a vehicle in building a more
equitable society. For labor governments in Scandinavia, not
revolution but education should emancipate the urban and
rural working class. Equal opportunity in education implied
national standardization and, hence, de-contextualization of
school curricula, thus disregarding the local circumstance
as a source of learning and character building. Since the
standard curricula reflected the urban, central, southern,
industrial more than the rural, peripheral, northern and
primary production situation, schooling as a tool in
creating a more equitable society has been less than
effective. Rather, students from rural areas, such as
fishing districts in North Norway, have been alienated from
their home community and from the knowledge, values and life
patterns of their parents. The impact can be traced to low
recruitment to primary industries such as fishing, out
migration of young people and depopulation of rural areas,
school drop-outs etc.
I suggest that the formal settings
of education should be subject to social research from the
perspective of ecological folk knowledge. What do students
learn about their home environment, the industries and life
situations of their local communities? Social researchers
could potentially play a constructive role in making schools
more appreciative of ecological folk knowledge and
increasing their ability and capacity of "re-embedding" the
educational and didactic processes from primary to
university level.
5. The growing interest in
ecological fisher folk knowledge can largely be explained by
the failure of resource management to prevent fish stocks
from being ruined. Current management systems are criticized
for ignoring this knowledge, and for relying only on the
input from scientists. The critics assume that a fisheries
management system that are based on ecological folk
knowledge will improve its efficacy: "[W]hen folk
knowledge and local perspectives are incorporated into a
larger management system as co-management, they may make the
difference between the system's having legitimacy or not,
having local relevance or not, and in general operating more
rather than less effectively" (Evelyn Pinkerton: "Summary
and Conclusions." In Christopher L. Dyer and James R.
McGoodwin: Folk Management in the Worlds Fisheries: Lessons
for Modern Fisheries Management. Boulder: University Press
of Colorado, 1994, p. 320-21.).
An important question is how this
knowledge should be represented in fisheries management. In
other words, should this be done directly by the users
themselves or indirectly by researchers as the users'
deputy? The former alternative may make many of the debates
on conceptual issues and methodology redundant. Or, the
research would then be limited to a purely academic
exercise, with no ambition of reforming management
practices. Management hardly needs to know everything which
users know about their eco-system, and everything that
researchers may know of this knowledge. Informing management
decision by means of ecological folk knowledge could simply
rely on users' representation in regulatory decision-making.
This, however, prompts the decision on which user-groups are
represented in the decision-making process and how - i.e. in
what capacity. Not all organizational set-ups allow
ecological folk knowledge to permeate the process. For
instance, it matters whether fishers represent a gear group
or a local community (See Svein Jentoft and Knut H.
Milkalsen: "Regulating fjord fisheries: Folk management or
interest group policies." In Dyer and McGoodwin, 1994, op
cit).
Neither do users always agree on
what is valid ecological folk knowledge. Since this
knowledge is drawn from experience, this should be no
surprise. People have different experiences, and they draw
different conclusions based on similar experiences.
Therefore, the management system must permit exchange and
deliberation on ecological folk knowledge, as is common
practice among marine scientists. "Ideal speech situations"
(Habermas) are hard to design, and power is likely to play a
role in the validation process, just as Finlayson has
documented is the case among marine scientists before they
present their advice to the management agency (Alan Chr.
Finlayson: Fishing for Truth. St. John's: ISER Books, 1994).
I suggest that these processes should be subject to social
research: In other words, we must study the representation
and validation processes of ecological folk knowledge within
co-management systems.
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